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1. Introduction 
 
The small developing country of El Salvador has been plagued by many years of 
violence, both from the eighteen years in a civil war and the ongoing proliferation of gang 
members.  As a highly volcanic area, El Salvador also faces the threat of natural disasters in the 
form of volcanic eruptions and earthquakes.  This level of high volatility in the country makes it 
all the more important for El Salvador to concentrate its economic development strategies on 
long term growth since Salvadorians must be prepared for the future and for unpredictable 
roadblocks to development.   
Along with these problems that El Salvador must face in an ever changing global 
economic climate as a less developed country, it must confront the negative effects of being 
closely tied to other countries, especially during times of recession.  At the same time, it is 
perhaps El Salvador’s close proximity and economic ties with the United States that have aided 
the country to reach higher levels of GDP growth.  In fact, El Salvador is among the top ten 
countries that receive remittances from the U.S. and these remittances constitute a significant 
amount of El Salvador’s gross domestic product.   
A main effect of these large remittance transfers was to facilitate El Salvador’s process of 
dollarization, switching its national currency from the colón to dollars and losing independent 
monetary policy.  These two matters have had large economic, social, and cultural impacts on the 
small country.  What are the real impacts of the remittances and switch to the dollar on the 
Salvadorian economy? And are these positive or negative?  If these are positives for the 
Salvadorian economy then should dollarization and remittances be promoted?  If they are 
negatives, then how can the Salvadorians change their economic policies to spur positive 
economic growth?  Through a review of the existing literature and analysis of current and past 
data as well as data from other countries for comparison, this paper evaluates the policies of 
dollarization and remittances and answers these questions.  The main conclusion reached is that 
these two policies must be coupled with other policies for economic development in order to curb 
their negative effects and take advantage of their positive features.   
 
1.1  Characteristics of El Salvador 
 
 To answer these questions we must first look at El Salvador closely.  It is the smallest, 
most densely populated country in Central America with a surface area of 21,000 square 
kilometers and a population of six million in 2009.  El Salvador is widely known in the region 
for its many volcanoes which make the land fertile for coffee beans, one of its largest exports.  
The country benefits from having a coast on the Pacific Ocean, which makes trade easier.  
Between 1984 and 1992, El Salvador experienced over a decade in social unrest due to the 
inequalities produced by having few landholders and many poor workers.  Both the guerillas and 
the military have ransacked houses, causing many Salvadorians to become reluctant to save or 
invest as their belongings and capital can be destroyed with another internal conflict.  This also 
has caused an influx of migration to the U.S. as many people feel that the country is unsafe, both 
because of the internal conflicts and the threat of Mara Salvatrucha or MS13, a very prominent 
gang that has even infiltrated the U.S.  Due to these safety issues El Salvador is not necessarily a 
tourist destination so the economy cannot rely on tourism as a large source of income and foreign 
direct investment into the country has not been large.  In order to attract FDI, the country has 
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undertaken several steps to liberalize the economy, most notably privatizations. The decision to 
dollarize was also an attempt to get FDI and the remittances that were entering the country from 
the United States helped lower the costs and difficulties of switching to the dollar as the county’s 
currency.  Remittances and dollarization in El Salvador can be traced back to the Temporary 
Protected Status that was granted to Salvadorians during the 1990’s and which continues to be 
granted today.  The country also engages in various trade agreements, including the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and free trade agreements with individual 
countries such as Canada, Mexico, and other Latin American countries. 
Legally, there are no currency restrictions in El Salvador as of December 31, 2009.  The 
IMF reports, in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, that 
the country has engaged in a unitary exchange arrangement, where both the dollar and the colón 
are accepted as legal tender and the dollar has unlimited redeemability for the settlement of debt 
through El Salvador.  Also, the Central Reserve Bank must exchange colónes in circulation for 
dollars on the request of banks at a “fixed and unalterable exchange rate” of 8.75 colónes per 
dollar.  There is no exchange tax or exchange subsidies and El Salvador has transactions in the 
foreign exchange market as well as the spot exchange market and interbank markets in Central 
America.  El Salvador is also part of the Central American and Monetary Council (CAMC). 
There is a large inflow and outflow of dollars in Latin America as a whole, mainly due to 
the closeness with the United States.  El Salvador, specifically dollarized in 2001 and much of 
the literature about this policy was written a few years after it was put in place, making it 
important to make an up to date analysis, now over a decade later, of the true consequences of 
dollarization for the country.   
 
1.2  Currency Valuation Options 
 
To begin with, all countries have four main options when it comes to currencies:  a 
country may choose to have a currency board, a floating exchange rate, a fixed exchange rate, or 
a country can dollarize (which means that it will use another country’s currency, not necessarily 
the U.S. dollar).  With a currency board a country must have 100 percent reserves at the currency 
board, which is the only source for converting currencies.  In this situation, a country’s currency 
is pegged to an anchor currency and the only currency flowing through the economy is equal to 
the country’s reserves at the currency board.  The currency board does not control monetary 
policy and is independent from the country’s government, creating confidence in the country and 
exchange rate stability in order to attract FDI.  Investors feel more confident when the 
governments of developing countries have less control over monetary policy because they feel 
that these governments have less capabilities and resources for determining the right mix of 
policies to stabilize the economy.  A floating exchange rate, on the other hand, is not controlled, 
leaving the assets and goods markets as well as speculation to determine currency evaluation.  It 
is the policy most advocated by the International Monetary Fund.  This policy makes currency 
valuation volatile and can have negative or positive effects on the whole economy.  With a fixed 
exchange rate, a country pegs its currency to an anchor currency, which is a strong currency that 
the country has chosen.  It can be difficult for some countries to keep their peg and they must 
sometimes increase borrowing in order to keep the amount of reserves for pegging.  Currency 
boards, fixed exchange rates, and dollarization all serve to create confidence in the currency of 
the home country.   
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Out of all of these policies dollarization can be the more extreme one, which is why it 
becomes a stronger source for investor confidence in a country.  When a country dollarizes, it 
begins to use a foreign currency instead of its own; some countries completely wipe out the old 
currency, while others continue to accept the original currency for transactions.  Like with 
currency boards, dollarization increases FDI levels for developing countries because the currency 
valuation is independent of the government.  El Salvador chose the dollarization route, taking 
advantage of the fact that Latin America can be considered a dollar block and the large 
remittance transfers from migrants in the United States.  However, if El Salvador chose to 
completely de-dollarize, there would be high costs associated with the transition back to the 
colón and according to Gresham’s law people may resist re-introduction of the colón because 
they would see it as an inferior currency to the dollar.  This means that El Salvador would 
hesitate to de-dollarize and, instead would have to formulate policies to counter negative effects 
of dollarization. 
 
 As a developing country, El Salvador must formulate economic policies that not only 
correct past economic problems, but that also aim to catch up to reach higher levels of 
development.  For this reason, it is important to analyze the effects of these two policies.  As was 
seen with the U.S.-Mexican relationship through NAFTA, an economic relationship with the 
U.S. can have positive effects and greatly stimulate the economy, but, as happened with the U.S. 
economic crisis and its effects on the Mexican economy, the U.S. can also negatively influence 
the economy.  Economic relationships and regional integration, especially in the current 
increasingly globalized world are crucial in many aspects, such as politics, culture, society, and 
economics.  This paper examines dollarization and remittances which are both a part of the 
economic regionalism that exists between the United States and Latin America.  El Salvador 
must determine the sustainability of these policies to be prepared, in the long term, for this new 
age of regionalism and growth that it has entered. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Requisites of Dollarization 
 
The close proximity of Latin America to the United States, along with the political 
influence of the U.S. as a global hegemon have proliferated dollars in the region.  This has 
caused the dollar to become an essential currency for trade and a few Latin American countries 
have turned to dollarization or exchange rates pegged to the dollar in order to relinquish 
monetary policy to the United States.  This is part of an effort to reduce and stabilize inflation as 
well as to increase confidence in the country, while giving up macroeconomic flexibility.  Not all 
countries are fit for dollarization or hard pegs and many experts on dollarization provide criteria 
that must preclude the adoption of another currency.   
Harvard economics professors Alberto Alesina and Robert J. Barro provide such criteria 
in their article “Dollarization” (2001).  They identify El Salvador as a country which fits the 
criteria.  However, the authors stress that all information and examination of dollarization 
revolves around small economies, since at the time of the writing the only large monetary union 
was in Europe for which there was little information.  Despite this, four characteristics of 
countries that might consider dollarization are given, these include: a history of variable and high 
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inflation; a large actual or potential volume of trade with the anchor country; business cycles that 
covary with the anchor; reasonably stable relative prices (as measured by real exchange rates) 
with respect to the anchor.  The authors use Mundell’s work on optimal currency areas (1961) as 
a reference, stating that countries have preferred currency unions because a higher importance 
has been placed on price stability over macroeconomic independence and monetary policies for 
economic growth.   
In their work, “Distributional Effects of Dollarisation: The Latin American Case,” 
University of North Carolina’s James W. Dean Jr. and Simon Fraser University’s Anil Hira 
(2004) also attempt to decipher where dollarization is conceivable.  They state that dollarization 
has benefits for some Latin American countries, but not for all of them.  The authors look at 
where dollarization makes sense in Latin America by dividing it into regions—Central America, 
Andean countries, and Mexico and Chile.  Out of all the regions, only Central America is named 
as a place where dollarization is feasible and convenient.  Reasons given are: the U.S. is the 
largest trade partner of the region, a high level of remittances are received in the area, the small 
economic size of each country, the difficulty the area has in attracting foreign investment, and 
the past progress made towards economic integration could be furthered with the dollar as basic 
currency.  It is important to note that the authors state that El Salvador is an exceptional case of 
dollarization as others countries dollarized as a response to a serious economic crisis, whereas El 
Salvador did not. 
In “The Socioeconomic Implications of Dollarization in El Salvador,” Marcia Towers and 
Silvia Borzutzky (2004), contribute to this claim, looking specifically at El Salvador.  They 
argue that dollarization in January 2001 was not needed in El Salvador and that, in fact, it has 
detrimental effects on the country.  They begin by giving a description of the Salvadorian 
economy—the fact that in the early 90’s the country implemented neoliberal economic policies, 
a large amount of remittances are received from the United States, and that there is high income 
inequality.  The authors state that El Salvador had some macroeconomic stability before the 
decision to dollarize, that is, inflation and interest rates were relatively low, the exchange rate 
was stable, and the country was showing growth in real GDP.  They use this information to back 
up the claim that dollarization was less necessary, unlike in other Latin American countries, such 
as Ecuador, where dollarization was used to get through very difficult economic conditions.  
Then the major factor that led to dollarization in El Salvador is discussed—a party representative 
of the upper class, ARENA, and a branch of it, ANEP, controlled politics at the time and 
advocated dollarization.  Through various data sources, the authors demonstrate that most of the 
population did not approve of dollarization and that there is low political participation in El 
Salvador to change the situation.   
 
2.2 Demand for Dollars 
 
A higher importance has been placed on the dollar by United States and international 
institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  University of Utah 
professor of economics, Kenneth P. Jameson looks closely at Latin America as a whole dollar 
bloc and shows that the dollar denominated loans and political influence exercised by the U.S. 
and the IMF to dollarize or peg currencies to the dollar have led these countries to circulate 
dollars.  He focuses heavily on the debt burden that these countries must incur when there are 
economic downturns as a result of the failures of dollarization in the region.  The United States 
and international organizations pressed for dollarization indirectly by freezing credit to Latin 
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American countries that could not pay their debts; once Ecuador dollarized and Argentina 
pegged the peso they were given IMF loans in dollars.  “Latin America and the Dollar Bloc in 
the Twenty-First Century: To Dollarize or Not?” (2001) explains that the two sources of demand 
for the dollar are to repay debt obligations and provide credibility for a country’s macroeconomic 
policies, which in turn attracts investment (foreign and domestic).  Jameson describes a cycle 
through which Latin America has become a dollar bloc, beginning in the 1980’s.  Dollars have 
been needed in Latin America because economic vulnerability from low savings rates and 
external shocks has led to increased debt, which becomes more of a burden when currencies 
depreciate, so Latin American economies have dollarized or fixed their exchange rates to the 
dollar, in turn, causing the loss of macroeconomic policy for the countries, which makes a full 
circle back to economic vulnerability.  After the 1980’s, with the Washington Consensus and 
IMF conditional loans that promote floating exchange rates, countries have maintained a high 
demand for dollars because currencies’ exchange rates tend to fall relative to the dollar so that 
they still need dollars for debt repayment.  Nevertheless, floating exchange rates lead back to 
economic vulnerability in the cycle because as exchange rates depreciate with respect to the 
dollar, the debt burden of the countries’ dollar denominated loans increases.  Chart 1 provides a 
visualization of this cycle.   
 
 
 
It is easy to see that as countries face more economic problems, they increase their dollar 
denominated debt burden, increasing the demand for dollars.  In fact, it is useful for El Salvador 
to be dollarized in order to repay debt on loans acquired during the civil war and after 
reconstruction during the 2001 earthquake.  In the 1970’s demand for dollars was also created by 
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the need to import petroleum and many countries incurred “petro-dollar loans,” which had to be 
repaid as dollars.  Additionally, tourism from the United States demands the usage of the dollar 
in Latin America. 
It is this increasing emphasis on the dollar that led many countries, especially Latin 
American countries, to peg their currencies to the dollar.  According to Jameson, informal 
dollarization was already occurring early on in Latin American history as there were many 
dollars circulating in the region, mainly because of remittance transfers and tourism.   
 
2.3 Negative Views of Dollarization 
 
In his second article, “Dollarization in Latin America: Wave of the Future or Flight to the 
Past?” (2003) Jameson uses “pattern models” for analysis and comes to the conclusion that 
dollarization is not the most effective way to better an economy, unless major international 
actors provide support for the policy.  He focuses specifically on Ecuador since it was the “most 
extreme contemporary dollarization” (644).  Although dollarization improved the Ecuadorian 
economy, there are still underlying problems that must be addressed to have a healthy economy.  
A problem in Ecuador, and other Latin American countries that are either dollarized or have a 
fixed exchange rate, is that dollarization lowers export income by reducing competitiveness since 
the currency cannot be depreciated.  Since El Salvador is dollarized, an appreciation of the dollar 
would mean that the country would have to find other ways of making their exports cheaper to 
countries that do not trade in dollars, which would most likely lead to the lowering of real wages.  
Another problem is the debt burden placed on Latin American countries, is too heavy for their 
economies to perform better.  Hira and Dean cite a dependence of dollarized Latin American 
countries on external loans and foreign banks when there is a bank crisis since the central bank 
cannot serve as lender of last resort.   
Jameson states that dollarization does not guarantee that other countries will see a 
dollarized country as heading toward credible economic progress. Like Jameson, these authors 
conclude that dollarization alone cannot solve deeper economic problems in Latin America.  
They show that GDP growth in El Salvador continued falling in 2000 and 2001, inflation 
decreased during the same time, interest rates were lowered, and FDI increased, but external debt 
continued to rise.  Argentina’s currency crisis in the 1990’s is used as an example to demonstrate 
the problems associated with pegging exchange rates and dollarization.  Panama and Ecuador’s 
lack of significant economic improvement is also used to show that dollarization alone is not the 
answer.  In assessing dollarization in Ecuador, Jameson cites that, although GDP grew after 
dollarization, per capita GDP was still very low.  This highlights the income inequality that 
dollarization creates.   
James W. Dean Jr. and Anil Hira take a closer look at the distributional effects of 
dollarization to weigh the costs and benefits of this policy.  El Salvador is analyzed specifically 
and the professors emphasize that there has been much political opposition to dollarization in El 
Salvador, especially from lower income groups, as dollarization increases income inequality.  It 
is asserted that dollarization has the potential to marginalize groups, such as small businesses and 
agricultural exporters since dollarization can disproportionally benefit those who have access to 
capital, making it easier for them to invest abroad in dollars.  Dean and Hira, as well as 
Borzutzky and Towers point out that people had to pay higher prices after rounding up for the 
exchange rate between the colón and the dollar.  These price increases have a more negative 
impact on these groups than on large business owners.  This is especially important in countries 
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like El Salvador in which there was, and still remains, a high level of income inequality.  Within 
El Salvador there was opposition to dollarization, mainly from the FMLN political group which 
perceived dollarization as a form of imperialism and source of inequality.   
Borzutzky and Towers provide the most specific study of dollarization in El Salvador, 
concluding that there are negative socioeconomic effects for the country.  According to the 
authors the costs are: loss of the use of monetary policy, the central bank can no longer function 
as lender of last resort, and money is lost as a symbol of nationality.  With the loss of monetary 
policy come other implications, such as in 2002 when, after an earthquake occurred, the budget 
deficit rose.  In this situation the government could not print more money so it had to be 
borrowed, but international financing was insufficient, therefore there were budget cuts, many of 
which reduced social services and programs that affect the poor.  The authors also point out that 
one of the positive effects of dollarization was to reduce interest rates, but this has no effect on 
the poor because they do not have access to formal credit markets in the country.   
We will use Panama as a country for comparison since Panama is one of the Latin 
American economies which have been dollarized for the longest.  Ilan Goldfajn, Gino Olivares, 
Jeffrey Frankel, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferrett discuss issues surrounding full dollarization, 
particularly focusing on Panama, which has been dollarized since 1904, in “Full Dollarization: 
The Case of Panama” (2001).  For the authors, the main areas in which dollarization is lacking 
are that it does not guarantee fiscal discipline and that default risk or high volatility of sovereign 
spreads are not precluded by the elimination of currency risk.  In their discussion, the authors 
highlight that a fixed exchange regime is more costly when shocks are asymmetric between 
economies in a monetary union.  Likewise, Alesina and Barro contend that there are higher costs 
to dollarization for a country if its business cycle is less correlated with the anchor country’s 
cycle.  About Panama specifically, the authors find that although its inflation performance was 
outstanding in relation to other Latin American countries, it had higher volatility of GDP growth.  
Panama’s performance during crises, the Asian, Russian and Brazilian, is compared to that of 
Argentina, which was dollarized under a currency board.  It would be expected that Panama 
would have a lower spread since it would have more credibility under a more rigid exchange rate 
system, but this is not the case—Panama and Argentina’s spreads move along a similar path.  As 
for fiscal discipline, the authors conclude that Panama’s dollarization did not improve the deficits 
because the country resorted to foreign debt, which it has relied on heavily, at times needing to 
suspend external payments.  Since fully dollarized economies cannot count on a central bank to 
be the lender of last resort, there is additional reliance on foreign borrowing by banks, so that in 
Panama foreign banks  accounted for 55 percent of the banking activity in 1997.  Overall, the 
authors suggest that dollarization is not a cure-all remedy for economic performance, but it has 
helped Panama in a few ways.   
 
2.4 Positive Views of Dollarization 
 
Despite these negative implications, there are positive aspects to dollarization as well.  
Alesina and Barro cite key advantages as: lowered transaction costs and increased credibility 
since “turning back” from dollarization is very costly, showing that the country is committed to 
economic stability.  Towers and Borzutzky state that the benefits of dollarization for El Salvador 
include: external credit access and foreign direct investment (which can already be seen in 
maquiladoras in the country).  Like Alesina and Barro, they cite lower international transaction 
costs which facilitate exporting and importing.  El Salvador especially benefits from lowered 
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transaction costs since its main trading partner is the U.S. which uses dollars.  Goldfajn et. al. 
highlight positive effects of dollarization in Panama.  This includes lower inflation that paralleled 
that of the U.S. once it dollarized.  According to the authors, dollarization also reduces the 
impact of external shocks and reduces the cost of borrowing, since credibility will reduce interest 
rates charged on debt.  The authors do recognize that this is shaky for Panama since, in late 2000 
Moody’s gave it a relatively low ranking among Latin American countries, although Standard & 
Poor’s gave it a bit of a higher ranking.  However, between 1961 and 1998 Panama had positive 
annual GDP growth, except for during the debt crisis in 1983 and between 1987 and 1988 when 
the U.S. imposed sanctions. 
Towers and Borzutzky point out that in order for any of these benefits to be sustainable, 
the country would have to invest more in education and training so that Salvadorian citizens 
benefit more equally. 
 
2.5 Characteristics of Remittances  
 
In defining remittances the World Bank states, in its World Databank that: 
 
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees comprise current transfers by 
migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by nonresident workers. Data are the sum 
of three items defined in the fifth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual: 
workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers. Remittances 
are classified as current private transfers from migrant workers resident in the host 
country for more than a year, irrespective of their immigration status, to recipients in their 
country of origin.  
 
The large amount of these remittance transfers into El Salvador are important for the economy, 
therefore taking a closer look at them is important for getting a fuller picture of the Salvadorian 
economy.  Gammage provides data on the Salvadorian economy for the period before 
dollarization and the conclusion is that migration from El Salvador to the United States began 
because of the civil war and because there was a drop in the agricultural sector in El Salvador.  
She also attributes the steady increases in migration from El Salvador to the liberalization of the 
economy (which caused the drop in the agricultural sector), the low savings rate, and policies, 
such as the Temporary Protected Status, in both the U.S. and El Salvador that have facilitated 
migration.   
The Senior Associate and director of remittances and development at the Inter-American 
Dialogue, Manuel Orozco, examines the actors that are part of remittance transfers in Latin 
America, in his article “Globalization and Migration: The Impact of Family Remittances in Latin 
America” (2002).  He underlines the importance of hometown associations, viajeros (informal, 
private couriers), international money transfer agencies, and financial institutions in the flow and 
capture of remittances.  These are the new actors that arise out of globalization and migration.  
Hometown associations (HTAs) are very important actors that help disperse remittances back to 
countries of origin in a way that betters social conditions for the country.  Through HTAs 
remittances can be used to provide food and clothing to people, improve infrastructure, improve 
human development—mainly education and health, and to invest in income generating projects 
in the country of origin.  While HTAs do not make profits, remittances do provide profits for 
some large and small financial intermediaries in both country of origin and migrant host country.  
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Orozco also notes that in El Salvador, food and goods as remittances are allowed to be imported 
into the country without import duties for merchandise up to $1,500.  Getting remittances into 
the formal banking sector is done through remittance bonds. 
“Remittance Behavior among Salvadoran and Filipino Immigrants in Los Angeles” by 
Cecilia Menjivar, Julie DaVanzo, Lisa Greenwell and R. Burciaga Valdez is a comparative study 
done by the RAND Program (1998).  The study is conducted by using information attained from 
a small population of Salvadorians and Filipinos living in Los Angeles, California in the 1990’s.  
It compares remittance practices between Salvadorian and Filipino immigrants in Los Angeles, 
in which both groups have a large amount of migrants.  The main observation made in this study 
is that Salvadorians tend to remit higher amounts, more often than Filipino immigrants, 
regardless of income in the United States, since Salvadorian migrants expect to return to their 
families in El Salvador, while Filipino migrants save to bring their families to the U.S.  It is also 
found that education is inversely related to the likelihood of remitting, but among those who 
remit education is positively related to the amount remitted.  Also, comparing Salvadorians to 
Filipinos, Salvadorians are more likely to remit even under less economic prosperity because 
their main reason to migrate is to help family members in El Salvador, while Filipinos are 
looking to bring their family to the U.S.  In a frequency distribution for the amounts remitted to 
El Salvador in 1990, the highest frequency was for remittances of $1001 to $5,000 in the year.  It 
is found that Salvadorians are likely to remit more than Filipinos, even though Filipinos tend to 
earn more money in the United States than Salvadorians.  Finally, it is found that when migrants 
have invested more in the U.S., they are less likely to remit (this includes capital investment and 
time investment).  It is clear, especially from this study, that remittances are an important part of 
the Salvadorian society and economy. 
 
 
2.6 Negative Views of Remittances 
 
There are different perspectives as to whether a reliance on remittances is sustainable in 
the long term and as to whether there are negative implications to remittance receipts overall.  In 
a general study about remittances from the IMF, Ralph Chami, Connel Fullenkamp and Samir 
Jahjah find that there is a negative relationship between remittances and per capita GDP, which 
signals that remittances may not be sustainable for long term growth.  The authors come to this 
conclusion using data on a panel of remittance receiving countries, so their conclusions are more 
general, instead of based on a single country study.  In order to reach their conclusions the 
authors first determine and explain that remittances are not like other capital flows because they 
are transferred with asymmetric information since there is a great distance between sender and 
receiver.  Also, remittance transfers are countercyclical in nature as they are compensatory, 
meaning that senders of remittances send more in times of economic hardship and less in times 
of economic prosperity.  Although the authors explain that there are many theories on motives 
behind remittance transfers, such as self interest or risk spreading, they accept the altruistic 
motive of remittance senders who want to help their family.  Despite this, the authors show that 
other motives of remittance sending also lead to the negative correlation of remittances and per 
capita GDP growth.  The reason for this negative correlation lies in the fact that a moral hazard 
exists between remitters and recipients, leading recipients to lower their labor productivity since 
they can receive more money from remitters, knowing that they will send more when the 
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recipients are going through economic hardship.  In effect, more remittances are sent when the 
receiver has a lower income or there is a lower per capita GDP in a given country.   
Sarah Gammage, in “Exporting People and Recruiting Remittances—A Development 
Strategy for El Salvador?,”  (2006) acknowledges that there is a downside to dependence on 
remittances, especially the dangers of illegal migration and the income inequalities that are 
produced.  An important fact that she cites is that very large percentages of rural families and 
farmers receive remittances with 40 percent of farming families and 34 percent of rural families 
reporting that they had at least one family member abroad between 1985 and 1994.  There are 
some implications involved with this because these are the people that are usually undocumented 
in the U.S. and have low levels of education, putting them in risky situations and low paying jobs 
that often pay below minimum wage.  Other negative aspects Gammage reports are that: 
remittances cause prices to rise, there is a higher demand for imported goods, there is an 
acceleration of land speculation, those who leave the country usually end up in debt because of 
the high costs of migration (Gammage estimates between 3,000 and 8,000 U.S. dollars that must 
be paid to formal or informal creditors), there is a danger to illegal migration (which occurs 
often), and most importantly remittances cause a rise in local inequality.  Additionally, the author 
states that “the migration safety valve functions to create wealth for a few” (96). 
 
2.7 Positive Views of Remittances 
 
Despite recognizing the negative aspects of remittances, Gammage makes the point that 
remittances are a viable way for El Salvador to achieve sustainable long term growth.  In 
reaching this conclusion, she points to the positive aspects of remittances for El Salvador.  These 
are: an easier transition to dollarization since there were many dollars circulating already, 
migration soaks up excess labor, remittances provide funds for improved infrastructure, they 
provide jobs to “viajeros” who travel back and forth delivering remittances, lack of investment is 
supplemented by capital inflows from abroad, they facilitate an expansion of the financial sector, 
and they compensate for the declining exports in the country.   
 
2.8 Other Economic Aspects 
 
 Although there are positive and negative implications to dollarization and remittances, 
these two economic factors do not fully explain the current economic situation of El Salvador.   
Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, José Miguel Benavente and Francisco Rodríguez examine 
other factors of economic growth in El Salvador in “Self-Discovery in a Development Strategy 
for El Salvador.”  Three determinants of growth are studied to see how they inhibit higher levels 
growth, these are: savings and investment effort, appropriabilty of these, and productivity.  
Specifically, the authors define the appropriability factor as, “the proportion of output generated 
by the assets that the [private] agents can appropriate” (Hausmann et. al. 48).  Exploring why 
reforms in El Salvador have failed to increase gross national income per capita and what can be 
done about it, they pinpoint the major problem to be productivity.  It is shown to be the problem 
because the traditional export sectors of the economy have not been doing well, but innovation 
and entrepreneurship have not occurred to counteract this.  The maquila industry is the only 
significant nontraditional industry, but it faces international competition, especially from China, 
which drives prices down.  The authors indicate that there is a very low level of innovation in El 
Salvador when compared to the other countries in the region as well as countries with similar 
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levels of development.  FDI would be a way to increase productivity, but since El Salvador has 
dollarized, labor is not as cheap as in other countries.  In the end, the authors conclude that the 
government must step in to stimulate innovation because of market failures which include: 
information externalities, coordination externalities, and labor training externalities.  Suggestions 
for growth include: promoting investment in new innovations through government subsidies, 
developing mechanisms for risky finance, reducing coordination problems through the use of 
social organizations for coordination (rent seeking behavior must be eliminated in this situation), 
partially socializing technical training and language skills, and government efforts to attract FDI. 
The Doing Business country profile for El Salvador also provides a detailed look at the 
business environment in the country, which signals areas that need to be improved for El 
Salvador to increase economic growth.  This report, put together by the World Bank, is an 
important profile for assessing El Salvador’s economic performance after dollarization.  
Dollarization, alone, cannot be the sole booster of economic development, but rather other 
economic policies that complement dollarization must be put in place if it is to further growth.  
This country profile provides useful information that at least partially explains why dollarization 
in El Salvador has not had a greater effect on economic growth.  El Salvador is compared to 182 
other countries and special attention is given to a regional comparison in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  In “business environment,” El Salvador ranks 112, with the regional average at a 95 
ranking.  The top regional ranker is Colombia and at the bottom is Honduras with a ranking of 
128.  “Business environment” is also compared for El Salvador from 2011 to 2012.  In 2012, El 
Salvador has exhibited a poorer performance than the year before.  The “starting a business” rank 
went from 129 to 136; the “dealing with construction permits” rank went from 141 to 144; the 
cost of construction permits as a percentage of income per capita also rose from 167.8 percent to 
168.3 percent; the “getting electricity” rank went from 126 to 130; the “registering a property” 
rank went from 50 to 54; the “getting credit” rank went from 45 to 48; the “paying taxes” rank 
went from 141 to 146; and lastly, the “enforcing contracts” rank changed from 57 to 66.  On the 
other hand, El Salvador performed better in a few areas—the “protecting investors” rank went 
from 172 to 166; the “trading across borders” rank changed from 72 to 69; and the “resolving 
insolvency” rank bettered from 93 to 88.  This data indicates that El Salvador’s business climate 
is not the most welcoming, which affects the domestic investment in businesses as well as 
foreign direct investment. 
 
All of this literature, along with raw data on El Salvador’s economy, provides crucial 
information in determining the sustainability of dollarization and remittances in this small 
country. 
 
3. Data Analysis 
  
3.1 General Data on the Salvadorian Economy 
 
 An analysis of El Salvador’s economic components juxtaposed with the effects of 
remittances and dollarization will be essential in determining whether the country’s relative 
prosperity in economic development, as is demonstrated by its ranking as third largest economy 
in Central America and classification as a middle income country, is sustainable in the long term.  
Despite the civil wars and natural disasters the country suffered, El Salvador has been able to 
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maintain a certain level of economic stability.  The “CIA World Factbook” states that El 
Salvador’s GDP in 2010 was $21.7 billion and the GDP per capita, using purchasing power 
parity, was $7,200.  Graph 1 shows the GDP annual percentage growth and GDP per capita 
annual percentage growth for El Salvador between the years 2001 and 2010. 
 An important factor that has influenced El Salvador’s economy is the Dominican 
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA-DR.  It is an agreement between El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States that was signed in 
2004.  Among these countries, El Salvador’s largest trading partner is the United States and 
according to the “CIA World Factbook,” in 2010 43.5 percent of Salvadorian exports were 
destined for the United States.  With a total of $4.577 billion in exports, El Salvador exported 
about $1.9 billion to the United States.  Total imports into the country were $8.189 billion in 
2010 and of this, 32.1 percent came from the United States, compromising $2.6 billion of El 
Salvador’s total imports.  This data demonstrates the importance of the United States for El 
Salvador’s international trade.  Trends in merchandise imports and exports between the United 
States and El Salvador for the time period between 2001 and 2010 are displayed in Graph 2 to 
emphasize this importance. 
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 As a small, developing country trade is important for El Salvador.  According to the IMF 
“October 2011 Country Report,” El Salvador’s export volume in 2010 rose 12.3 percent, 
although in the previous year there was a 16 percent decline in exports (16).  At the same time, in 
2009 imports fell by 24.8 percent and in 2010 they rose by 11.1 percent.  In more absolute terms, 
El Salvador’s exports in 2010 were $4.547 billion and imports were $7.902 billion in the same 
year (CIA World Factbook).The maquiladora sector (and the service sector, overall) has become 
important for exports as well, although there is increased global competition, and in 2009 this 
sector rose by 1.6 percent and 1.8 percent in 2010 (IMF October 2011 Country Report 16).  
Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP as well as annual percentage growth for El 
Salvador are displayed in Graph 3 for the years 2001 to 2010.  The same is shown for imports of 
goods and services in Graph 4. 
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 Another important economic indicator for El Salvador as a developing country is foreign 
direct investment.  El Salvador ranks third in Central America for FDI, lagging significantly 
behind Panama and Costa Rica (UNCTAD 10).  The United States is El Salvador’s major FDI 
supplier, accounting for about 30 percent of all FDI (UNCTAD 13). On average, between 2006 
and 2008, El Salvador had FDI inflows of $844.6 million (UNCTAD 12) and according to the 
IMF “October 2011 Country Report,” FDI increased by .4 percent in 2010 a decrease from the 
2009 growth of 1.8 percent (16). 
 As with many of the Latin American countries, El Salvador has a significant external debt 
burden.  As of December 2010, the external debt is $12.06 billion, up from $11.38 billion from 
the year before (CIA World Factbook).  This means that for 2010 external debt was about 55.6 
percent of GDP.  In Graph 5 we can see the trends in external debt stocks as a percentage of GNI 
between the years 2001 and 2010.   
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The IMF “October 2011 Country Report” also states that gross domestic investment in El 
Salvador grew by 13.4 percent in 2009 and then by 13.3 percent in 2010, while gross domestic 
savings grew by 12 percent in 2009 and 11 percent in 2010.  Graph 6 shows the generally 
declining trends in gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP between the years 2001 and 
2010. 
 
 
 
 The previous are all purely macroeconomic indicators, but there are other factors that 
must be taken into account to get a full picture of El Salvador’s economic development.  
According to the United Nations International Human Development Indicators 2011 statistics:  
Salvadorian citizens have a life expectancy of 72.2 years, adult literacy for both sexes aged 15 
and above is 84.1 percent of the population, the Gini coefficient is 46.9, gender inequality is at 
.487, and 5.1 percent of the population lives below $1.25 a day (it is important to note that this 
number was 6 percent in 2005 and 11 percent in 2008).  The most startling of these numbers is 
the Gini coefficient, showing that there is a high level of inequality in El Salvador.  Overall, the 
Human Development Index for El Salvador is .674, which is below the HDI for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, which is .731.   
 Comparing El Salvador with its neighboring countries is also important for evaluating its 
economic development.  Honduras, a similar country, and Panama, often a leader for 
development in Central America, will be analyzed for this comparison and data from the 2011 
World Development Indicators will be used.  In GDP growth, measured by average annual 
percentage growth, El Salvador’s is the lowest among the countries.  In 2009 these figures were -
3.5 percent for El Salvador, 2.4 percent for Panama, and -1.9 percent for Honduras, while in 
2010 these measures were 1.3 percent for El Salvador, 5.7 percent for Panama, and 2.4 percent 
for Honduras.   Data on annual percentage GDP growth for all three countries between the years 
2001 and 2010 is demonstrated in Graph 7. 
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For 2009, the emigration of people with tertiary education to OECD countries, ages 25 
and up, as a percentage of the total tertiary educated population, was 31.7 percent for El 
Salvador, 24.8 percent for Honduras, and 16.7 percent for Panama, showing that El Salvador has 
an alarmingly high amount of its highly educated people leaving the country and at a higher rate 
than either of the two other countries.  Aid dependency, measured by net official development 
assistance, was $180 million in 2000 in El Salvador and this number increased to $277 million in 
2009.  Panama’s aid dependency increased from $15 million in 2000 to $66 million in 2009.  For 
Honduras these figures were $448 million in 2000 and $457 million in 2009.  This data shows 
that Honduras receives the most development aid overall, but from 2000 to 2009 its aid 
dependency only increased by $9 million, while Panama’s increased by $51 million and El 
Salvador had the largest increase of $93 million between the two years.  In 1995, El Salvador 
had the lowest external debt among the three countries, but this changes in 2009.  For 1995 El 
Salvador’s external debt was $2,509 million, while Panama’s was $6,098 million and Honduras 
had $4,851 million in debt for the same year.  El Salvador’s external debt in 2009 was $11,384 
million, closely following Panama’s $12,418 million, but far from Honduras’ drop in external 
debt, at $3,675 million in the same year.  Another important economic development indicator is 
gross savings and for 2009 El Salvador exhibited the lowest gross savings, measured as a 
percentage of gross national income, with 11.7 percent.  The highest gross savings were 
exhibited by Panama with 37.4 percent of GNI and Honduras was in the middle with 16.6 
percent.  Overall, we can see that El Salvador does not fare well with Panama and Honduras for 
the most part, but that it remains on a moderate path towards development. 
All of these economic indicators and statistics point to the fact that El Salvador’s 
economy has fared well, but there are indicators that demonstrate some potential problems for 
the Salvadorian economy in the long term, such as the diminishing levels of saving and 
investment along with increasing external debt and budget deficits, as well as high levels of 
inequality. 
 
3.2 Why remittances? 
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 Understanding remittance and migration trends of Salvadorians in the United States is 
crucial for studying the economic development of El Salvador, as remittances constitute perhaps 
the largest contribution of economic development for the country.  As a developing country, El 
Salvador has relied on the exports of agricultural products, such as coffee, cotton, and sugar for 
income, but these prices have declined significantly, so that “increasingly, El Salvador’s most 
important export is people” (Gammage 75).  This is clear when we see data indicating that 
“remittances accounted for 16 percent of GDP in 2009, and about a third of all households 
receive these transfers” (CIA World Factbook).  The 2011 Remittance and Migration Factbook 
sites that the amount of remittances received for 2010 were $3.6 billion with stock of emigrants 
as a percentage of the population, at 20.5 percent in the same year.  Graph 8 shows the amount of 
workers’ remittances received in El Salvador and Graph 9 shows the percentage of GDP this 
constitutes for the time period between 2001 and 2010. 
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Remittances have become so important that the government is actively involved in 
remittance transactions; Gammage illustrates this in her paper “Exporting People and Recruiting 
Remittances” when she writes: 
 
  The Salvadoran state is increasingly trying to channel and augment remittances to 
  leverage development, encouraging their investment in collective projects that can 
  generate employment and provide basic infrastructure.  Government-sponsored  
  programs are being developed and refined to capture these remittances and focus 
  their expenditure through co-financing…The government is also actively reaching 
  out to communities of Salvadorans in the United States through its embassies and 
  consular services…In tandem with these developments, the Inter-American  
  Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank are encouraging government  
  programs to channel individual and collective remittances…In 2004 remittances  
  to Latin America reached a little over US$40 billion.  This amount exceeded the  
  combined flows of all foreign direct investment and net official development  
  assistance to the region. (76) 
 
A major initial reason for the high numbers of Salvadorian migrants is the civil war of the 
1980’s, although later migration can be attributed to the Temporary Protected Status that was 
granted to Salvadorians during the 1990’s and which continues to provide preferential 
immigration status to Salvadorians in the United States.  The main destination for Salvadorian 
migrants is the United States and the flow of migrants to the United States peaked between 1985 
and 1990 with 155,000 women and 179,000 men reporting that they entered the country in these 
years, representing an increase from 20,000 men and 25,000 women migrating to the United 
States between 1970 and 1974 (Gammage 77).  These large numbers of migrants provide 
Salvadorian families with income that would not be available to them in El Salvador. 
 
3.3 Effects of Remittances 
 
 This large outflow of people from El Salvador has had long lasting effects for the 
country.  Urbanization and private consumption have increased in the postwar period, fueled by 
the influx of remittances that are encouraged by financial reforms and banking deregulation, 
which have increased credit to the urban sector (Gammage 79).  The structure of the Salvadorian 
economy has changed in order to facilitate and capture remittance flows.  Now it is a service and 
transit economy, importing consumer goods and exporting people, causing the social structure of 
El Salvador to change from agricultural-based elites to elites in construction, transportation and 
communications, freight services, and the financial sector, which are activities that rely 
extensively on migration and remittances for capital and sales (Gammage 83).  It is the financial 
sector that has mostly expanded since remittance flows create the need for savings accounts, 
lines of credit, and transfer methods.  Remittances have been especially beneficial for companies 
like Western Union in the United States and transfer agencies and banks in El Salvador, such as 
Banco Agrícola.  There are also many viajeros that travel back and forth between El Salvador 
and the United States and these make up a large amount of remittance services as they may carry 
as much as $240 million per year, approximately 11 percent of all remittances entering the 
country (Gammage 88).  Viajeros have been facilitated in remittance transfers, in the form of 
goods brought back to El Salvador from abroad, as the Salvadorian customs office has liberal 
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regulations on import duties since Salvadorians, in the early 2000’s, were allowed to bring up to 
$1,500 worth of merchandise into the country without duty (Orozco 57).  The heavy use of 
viajeros indicates that formal financial intermediaries are not available to all. 
 Although viajeros and other financial intermediaries benefit from transfers, remittances 
do have negative effects for the economy.  Gammage examines the costs of remittances, which 
are that “remittances contribute to rising prices, they spur the consumption of imported goods, 
accelerate land speculation, and increase local inequality” (93).  Additionally, migrants and their 
families must assume debts in order to send a family member abroad and they must suffer the 
hardships of being separated, some migrants must even endure the dangers of the journey to the 
United States (Gammage 94).  In “Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for 
Development?” the authors conclude that there is yet another negative implication of 
remittances, in that remittances are compensatory, rising with the level of altruism and falling as 
the recipients’ wages rise, so that there is a negative relationship between measures of the 
recipients’ income and level of remittances (62).  In effect, this means that remittance levels and 
per capita GDP in the home country have an inverse relationship. 
 At the same time, there are many benefits.  On a macro level, remittances supply foreign 
exchange to capital-poor countries, liquidity to governments, mitigate balance-of-payment 
problems, and they are a means of providing hard currency, while on a micro level they furnish 
poor families with necessary income to improve their living standards (DaVanzo et al. 98). 
 For El Salvador, remittances provide many benefits and include many costs for 
individuals who migrate as well as future benefits; this paper attempts to look at remittance 
behaviors, trends, and flows in order to examine whether remittances are a long term sustainable 
source of economic growth for the country and what this implies for policies. 
 
3.4 Why dollarize? 
 
 The official currency in El Salvador prior to January 2001 was the colón, but since then 
the country has joined the many countries that have chosen to dollarize in order to achieve 
economic growth.  In “The Socioeconomic Implications of Dollarization in El Salvador” Towers 
and Borzutzky write that: 
 
  International economic analysts recommend dollarization to countries that are  
  experiencing hyperinflation as a way of bringing about fiscal and budgetary  
  discipline.  In the year 2000, El Salvador’s economy was not experiencing a crisis; 
  but the government justified the decision to dollarize by stating that the policy  
  would lower interest rates, increase foreign investment, and decrease transaction  
  costs in international trade, thereby sparking economic growth.  (29) 
 
Unlike many other countries that have chosen to dollarize their economies, El Salvador was not 
going through an economic downturn and it already had relatively low interest rates, so why did 
El Salvador dollarize?   
 Remittances from the United States to El Salvador are perhaps the greatest contributors to 
dollarization in El Salvador.  Since the country already had a large amount of dollars circulating 
in the economy because of the remittances, it was easier for the government to dollarize and 
enjoy the advantages from dollarization.  Although the United States is El Salvador’s largest 
trading partner, dollar inflows from the United States through exports do not create significantly 
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large net inflows of dollars into the country since El Salvador pays more dollars to the United 
States for imports, but a significant source of dollar inflows comes from remittances and, as 
Gammage writes, “Dollarization would not have been so easily shepherded through the 
legislature had it not been for the abundant source of dollars entering the economy in the form of 
remittances” (85).  As a top remittance receiver, inflows of $3.6 billion entered El Salvador in 
2010—a number that is comparable to the $4.577 billion that entered the country through export 
incomes in the same year.   
 Remittance inflows in the form of dollars are key for debt repayment in El Salvador, 
which has a high debt burden.  When countries need to borrow money they are usually required 
to repay their debt in dollars, so that, as Jameson writes, “interest payments represent a demand 
for dollars that binds regardless of the performance of the export sector, the terms of trade, or 
any other measure of economic performance [and] the prime challenge that faced Latin 
American policy makers after 1980 was to satisfy this unavoidable demand for their dollar 
resources” (“The Dollar Bloc” 9).  Developed countries and the IMF have required Latin 
American countries to fully service their debt for the most part, but Jameson reports that “the 
only realistic way performance can improve is through reducing the debt burden of the debt 
owed to the international financial system, thereby increasing the resources that can be dedicated 
to domestic needs” (“Dollarization in Latin America” 657).   
 Another major case made for dollarization is that it provides the appearance of economic 
stability and credibility since there is no risk of exchange rate devaluation and the government 
surrenders macroeconomic control to a nation that appears to be more stable, like the United 
States.  This is because currency speculation and devaluation are a threat to investors, therefore 
“a reliable fixed exchange rate can also encourage long-term investment in developing countries, 
since investors can confidently predict a rate of return” (Hira, Dean 462).  For domestic 
borrowers there are also benefits since “foreign currency borrowing carries less risk and because 
inflation and hence interest rates are constrained by foreign levels” (Hira, Dean 462). Also, 
countries that dollarize enjoy lower transaction costs since currencies do not have to be 
exchanged, facilitating trade.   
 Although there was some opposition to dollarization in El Salvador, especially from the 
FMLN party, the economy continues to use the dollar as its currency and it continues to do 
relatively well.  Although El Salvador has lost the colón as a symbol of identity, through 
dollarization it has been able to expand international economic integration. 
   
3.5 Effects of Dollarization 
 
 One of the justifications for dollarization in El Salvador was the prospect of economic 
growth, but results have been less than impressive, although they cannot all be attributed to the 
single policy of dollarization.  Looking at data near the time of dollarization, the GDP growth 
rate in 2000 was 2 percent, 1.8 percent in 2001, and growth for the first six months of 2002 was 
1.7 percent, the lowest growth in five years; all of these can be attributed to declining 
international trade, competitiveness problems in the Salvadorian economy, and the recession in 
the United States (Towers, Borzutsky 44).  In fact, the 2011 “IMF Country Report” establishes 
that growth has been lower in El Salvador than in the rest of Central America since 2005 and that 
the recovery from the global recession has remained mild (10). 
 Another justification provided by the Salvadorian government for dollarization was that it 
would attract foreign direct investment, but this factor has also shown results that rank below 
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what would be expected.  An explanation for this may lie in the Doing Business report, which 
indicates that El Salvador’s business environment is not the most conducive for FDI.  A look at 
Standard and Poor’s sovereign rating for El Salvador can provide key insight into why “FDI 
inflows have been relatively modest in absolute terms, but comparable to the developing 
countries average in relative terms…however, many small countries have succeeded in attracting 
significantly higher inflows of FDI in relative terms, which indicates that El Salvador could fare 
much better in the future if the conditions were right (UNCTAD 11).  As of March 2011, 
Standard and Poor gives El Salvador a rating of BB-/Stable/B and the weaknesses stated for El 
Salvador are that it has growing political divide because of disagreements between the legislative 
and executive branch, lackluster economic growth and prospects, and structural and political 
impediments to correct long standing fiscal rigidities which could lead to an unsustainable debt 
burden.  This rating along with the present violence and poverty that exist in El Salvador create 
disincentives for investors.  Hira and Dean put this into perspective when they write, “Even 
when countries such as El Salvador get not only their macroeconomic fundamentals right and 
begin major privitisations as part of second generation reform, there is nevertheless no guarantee 
that sought-after foreign investment will be forthcoming in any significant amount” (478). 
 Along with these macroeconomic results, there are many effects of dollarization on the 
poor in El Salvador.  Towers and Borzutsky demonstrate that dollarization was a difficult 
transition for many since “proper information and orientation were not provided to the 
public…the results were confusion, frequent errors, or purposive cheating in monetary 
transactions” (47).  Also, since the exchange rate between the colón and the dollar was 8.75, the 
transition to the dollar caused inflation from rounding up, especially in the informal market, 
where many poorer Salvadorians operate and “the poor often buy in very small quantities, 
creating a greater inflationary effect” (Towers, Borzutsky 48).   
 A main negative aspect of dollarization is that the government loses the ability to use 
monetary policy to affect the economy.  The government can no longer finance budget deficits 
by issuing currency and it cannot adjust the exchange rate in order to compete effectively in the 
export market so that a country’s competitiveness in the short run is only improved by reducing 
prices and wages to lower the price of exports (Towers, Borzutsky 41).  Losing monetary policy 
also means that the Central Bank of El Salvador will no longer be able to provide banks with 
funds as a lender of last resort.  According to Hira and Dean in “Distributional Effects of 
Dollarization,” this creates dependence, especially under a bank crisis since the government must 
then rely on external borrowing (463).  Along with the loss of monetary policy, the Salvadorian 
government lost the ability to continue printing money, thereby losing seigniorage earnings, 
although this constitutes a small percentage of GDP. 
 Although there do not seem to be highly negative implications to dollarization in El 
Salvador, there also seems to be a lack of highly positive effects of dollarization.  When we look 
at the current economic data for El Salvador, we can see that El Salvador has grown at a stagnant 
rate, but this is not only due to the policy of dollarization. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
 Three questions were posed in the beginning of the paper: What are the real impacts of 
remittances and the switch to the dollar on the Salvadorian economy?; Are these positive or 
negative?; If these are positives for the Salvadorian economy then should dollarization and 
25 
 
remittances be promoted?  In order to answer these questions, literature and the most current data 
available were consulted.  When these two are looked at together, they reveal that the 
Salvadorian economy has not fared as well as many of the other Latin American countries, 
especially in the areas of GDP growth and gross savings, which are crucial for future economic 
development.  At the same time El Salvador has remained a middle income country.  This is 
because there are positive and negative aspects to dollarization and remittances, they are not just 
all positive or all negative.  
 Despite the mixed opinions of the authors that wrote the literature that was consulted, the 
answer to the first question is that there have not been significant impacts on the Salvadorian 
economy as a result of the policy of dollarization or remittances.  Most notably, GDP growth has 
diminished in recent years, but this could be mainly due to the global recession.  The export of 
goods and services has decreased, but remains at a relatively high level in comparison to other 
Central American countries, which has to do with the trade agreements, most notably CAFTA-
DR, which El Salvador has been a part of in recent years.  External debt has increased, which can 
be attributed to the loss of monetary policy because of dollarization which leads the country to 
resort to outside lending.  At the same time, borrowing due to the 2001 earthquake adds to the 
debt burden of the country.   
 There are many alternate explanations for El Salvador’s stagnant economic performance, 
but overall there are a few identifiable impacts of dollarization and remittances which can assess 
whether the two factors are desirable for economic development in the country and these impacts 
help to answer the second question.  Dollarization has negative generational distribution impacts 
caused by the high debt that is incurred now and left for repayment by future generations.  El 
Salvador has incurred relatively high levels of debt and was granted another loan from the IMF 
in October 2011 for $602 million.  Without individual monetary policy and a central bank as a 
lender of last resort, El Salvador may continue to depend on external loans in order to pay for 
imports.  The government may also cut back on social services or spending on infrastructure and 
technology in order to finance their external debt.  A positive impact of dollarization is that the 
country will not have exchange rate risk that might cause it to have to pay higher interest on the 
debt, since most loans will be denominated in dollars.  Also, since El Salvador mostly trades 
with the United States and a few other countries that use the dollar, there are lower transaction 
costs to trade since there is no cost of exchanging currencies.  The most important positive 
impacts of remittances have been that they provide capital to the country, they provide poor 
families with income, and they create remittance transferring jobs, such as viajeros.  But a major 
negative impact of encouraging remittances is that they create dangerous migration situations 
which put many lives in danger, while the IMF has recognized that remittances diminish worker 
productivity and motivation in home countries. 
 These impacts of dollarization and remittances must be weighed out by the Salvadorian 
government in order to determine the best course of action for economic growth.  Ultimately, the 
last question must be answered and a final decision must be made about de-dollarization and an 
end to remittance encouragement.  If El Salvador chose to completely de-dollarize, there would 
be high costs associated with the transition back to the colón; if there was an attempt to stop 
remittance flows, then the benefits of remittances would not be captured in an effective way to 
encourage growth.  In the short term, these policies must be kept because of their use in 
facilitating economic development, but with the use of other policies along with these, El 
Salvador could continue more successfully as a dollarized economy, while working towards a 
natural decrease in remittance flows.   
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This could be achieved by creating incentives for technology transfers between foreign 
firms that invest in El Salvador and the Salvadorian society.  As a result, El Salvador could be 
more productive and engage in trade of goods and services that have opportunities for higher 
incomes, which would mean that El Salvador could continue to benefit from the lower 
transaction costs and facilitation of loan repayment that dollarization provides, while relying less 
on external financing to keep a balance of payments and trade.  The increase in technology 
transfer, and with it higher productivity and higher standards of living, may also lower the need 
for remittance transfers and may encourage more people to stay in El Salvador.   Along with this, 
El Salvador could also increase productivity and standards of living by creating incentives and 
opportunities for educational transfers from the countries where the citizens are migrating.  
Programs could be created to help migrants achieve higher education in other countries, while at 
the same time creating incentives so that the migrants return to El Salvador.  In conjunction with 
this, El Salvador would need to provide better educational opportunities within the country, so 
that the educational level of the whole country could be raised.  This would channel remittance 
flows in a more efficient way through remittance senders and receivers with higher education 
and, ultimately, the remittance flows to El Salvador would decrease because more migrants 
would be returning to El Salvador. 
  These policies offer sustainable long term growth, looking to the future.  They require 
government intervention and institutions in order to create policies that concentrate resources 
where they are needed for technological and educational transfers as well as to better educational 
opportunities within the country.  El Salvador could get educational transfers by offering to 
partially subsidize education abroad, where there are more opportunities for education, with the 
agreement that the migrant will return at a certain time.  This will not only bring back more 
productive citizens to El Salvador, but it will also create more opportunities to better education 
within the country because some of the migrants that come back can share their educational 
experiences.  To achieve this, a certain level of government coordination and planning would be 
required.  The amount of government intervention that the Salvadorian government will want to 
or will be able to engage in must be questioned if these policies are to be put into place.  In the 
past, most notably the Southeast Asian countries, government intervention in the economy has 
spurred growth, but El Salvador’s government, culture, and values differ greatly from others 
which have set precedents.  The global climate is also changing and along with it, the 
opportunities for economic development.  El Salvador must attempt to move forward with 
growth in a global climate that includes a struggling worldwide economic recession, the 
European debt crisis, and a global economic order in which there are already many developing 
countries, making it more difficult for less developed countries to bargain and find trade 
advantages.  As a small country, El Salvador will need to depend on trade in order to grow 
because not all of the needed resources will be found within the country, therefore the country 
will need to work to find ways of making trade work to its advantage.  Dollarization is one way 
of facilitating trade for Salvadorians, but the high and increasing debt burden on the country can 
pose a challenge for future growth, especially if the country is not exhibiting substantial growth 
and productivity in order to repay these loans.   
 In the end, El Salvador must better the productivity and capacity of its people in order to 
grow.  This includes putting an end to gang violence, one of El Salvador’s largest problems, and 
reversing the increased inequality in the country, both of which can be addressed through 
technological and educational transfers.  Economic development strategies can often just target 
short term goals, but I propose that El Salvador look at some long term goals in order to better its 
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society and future development.  It would be too expensive for El Salvador to de-dollarize, but 
the country will need to combat the debt that it is relying on because of its loss of independent 
monetary policy.  Remittances can provide needed resources for those receiving them, but 
continue lacking to provide a sufficient source of growth because of the moral hazard involved 
with their transfers.  An amalgam of these two policies along with new, broader policies for 
economic development can show positive results for El Salvador.   
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